

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET CONTROL
A. C. OF S., G-2, DA**

TAB "A"

026887

**G-2, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-25,
SOVIET INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL WAR****1.2. (1)**

The Soviet Army is a powerful and effective ground combat force.

The senior command is ruthless, energetic and experienced. The junior officers may be expected to execute orders faithfully and to demand rigid compliance with orders in accord with a blind code of discipline. The individual soldier is courageous, cunning, possessing physical stamina, follows his leaders without question, and his inherent patriotism for Mother Russia precludes any large-scale desertions for as long as the situation is favorable to Soviet arms. The Soviet Army possesses the advantages of a unified command and a concentration of force on interior lines and potentially of exercising the initiative. Soviet equipment is adequate both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The present estimate of strength of the Soviet Army is approximately 2,500,000 troops (excluding internal security forces) comprising about 175 line divisions. The Soviets could mobilize by D + 30, an additional 145 line divisions and could subsequently increase this number if required. The present disposition of Soviet divisions is as follows:

Soviet Zone of Germany	22	22
Remainder of occupied Europe	8	
Western U.S.S.R.	73	
Caucasus	21	
Middle Asia	16	
Far East and Eastern Siberia	35	
TOTAL	175	

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The Soviet Union possesses the capability of invading Western Europe without any additional warning, with an initial force of about 25 divisions, and of rapidly building this force to about 75 to 90 divisions, or, of invading with a larger initial force after some shifting of divisions. In the latter case there might be some warning of the impending attack.

NATO ground forces in Western Europe, exclusive of U. S. forces, are as follows:

IN GERMANY & AUSTRIA

U.K.	2 Armd. Divs - 1 Inf Div
France	1 Armd. Div - 2 Inf Div
Denmark	(1 Inf Bn)
Norway	(1 Inf Brig)
Belgium	1 Inf Div
Luxembourg	(1 Inf Bn)
	7 Divisions

STATIONED AT HOME

U.K.	1 Inf Div - 1 Armd Div - (1 Prcht Brig - 1 Inf Brig)
France	3 Inf Div - 1 Armd Div - 1 A/B Div - 1 Mt Div.
Italy	9 Inf Divs - 1 Armd Brig - (1 Alpine Brig)
Belgium	(1 Brig)
Portugal	(35 Regts)
	17 Divisions

Note: Units in parenthesis are not included in the totals.

The state of readiness of these NATO Forces is below that of the Soviet Union forces.

1.b. (2)

It is estimated that stockpiling is such that the existing 175 Soviet divisions can be supported in combat operations for at least one year.

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On the basis of military economic production estimates it is considered that the Soviet stockpiling program for finished war materiel of all classes is intended to be sufficient to support any forces mobilized for at least a similar one year period.

Soviet supply doctrine provides for the constant maintenance of a 30-day level of supply in all tactical units. On the basis of current identifications the level of tactical supplies maintained in Europe is far above a 30-day requirement. In addition, known strategic reserves in the U.S.S.R. strongly indicate the Soviet desire to wage war independently of extensive new production.

Transportation vulnerability in the Far East has caused the Soviets to undertake even more extensive stockpiling of military supplies of all classes in this area. Known stockpiled reserves are considered sufficient for military operations by the 35 divisions now deployed in the area for at least one year. It is probable that up to 50 divisions can be so supported from these stockpiles.

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